SIG-CLOUD-9: X86/KASLR fixes for HMM utilized by CUDA + temp fixes/workaround for HMM kselftest #4
Conversation
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
jira SECO-170 bugfix cuda hangs commit-author Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> commit ea72ce5 upstream-diff Missing CONFIG_KMSAN commits in arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h iounmap() on x86 occasionally fails to unmap because the provided valid ioremap address is not below high_memory. It turned out that this happens due to KASLR. KASLR uses the full address space between PAGE_OFFSET and vaddr_end to randomize the starting points of the direct map, vmalloc and vmemmap regions. It thereby limits the size of the direct map by using the installed memory size plus an extra configurable margin for hot-plug memory. This limitation is done to gain more randomization space because otherwise only the holes between the direct map, vmalloc, vmemmap and vaddr_end would be usable for randomizing. The limited direct map size is not exposed to the rest of the kernel, so the memory hot-plug and resource management related code paths still operate under the assumption that the available address space can be determined with MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS. request_free_mem_region() allocates from (1 << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS) - 1 downwards. That means the first allocation happens past the end of the direct map and if unlucky this address is in the vmalloc space, which causes high_memory to become greater than VMALLOC_START and consequently causes iounmap() to fail for valid ioremap addresses. MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS cannot be changed for that because the randomization does not align with address bit boundaries and there are other places which actually require to know the maximum number of address bits. All remaining usage sites of MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS have been analyzed and found to be correct. Cure this by exposing the end of the direct map via PHYSMEM_END and use that for the memory hot-plug and resource management related places instead of relying on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS. In the KASLR case PHYSMEM_END maps to a variable which is initialized by the KASLR initialization and otherwise it is based on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS as before. To prevent future hickups add a check into add_pages() to catch callers trying to add memory above PHYSMEM_END. Fixes: 0483e1f ("x86/mm: Implement ASLR for kernel memory regions") Reported-by: Max Ramanouski <[email protected]> Reported-by: Alistair Popple <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Tested-By: Max Ramanouski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Alistair Popple <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87ed6soy3z.ffs@tglx (cherry picked from commit ea72ce5) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
jira SECO-170 In Rocky9 if you run ./run_vmtests.sh -t hmm it will fail and cause an infinite loop on ASSERTs in FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() This temporary fix is based on the discussion here https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-kselftest/patch/[email protected]/#25046055 We will investigate further kselftest updates that will resolve the root causes of this.
PlaidCat
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 1, 2024
jira LE-2015 cve CVE-2024-40904 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-5.14.0-427.42.1.el9_4 commit-author Alan Stern <[email protected]> commit 22f0081 The syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in the cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver's immediate resubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the dummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup: cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71 cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625] CPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup: #1: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #2: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #3: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #4: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #5: 98% system, 1% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle Modules linked in: irq event stamp: 73096 hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994 hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551 softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582 softirqs last disabled at (73043): [<ffff800080020de8>] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588 CPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Testing showed that the problem did not occur if the two error messages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding material to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time. In any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to avoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is to ratelimit the two dev_err() calls. Therefore we replace them with dev_err_ratelimited(). Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Greg KH <[email protected]> Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/ Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/ Fixes: 9908a32 ("USB: remove err() macro from usb class drivers") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 22f0081) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
PlaidCat
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Dec 17, 2024
jira LE-2169 cve CVE-2024-38540 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.27.1.el8_10 commit-author Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> commit 78cfd17 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-4.18.0-553.27.1.el8_10/78cfd171.failed Undefined behavior is triggered when bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq is called with hwq_attr->aux_depth != 0 and hwq_attr->aux_stride == 0. In that case, "roundup_pow_of_two(hwq_attr->aux_stride)" gets called. roundup_pow_of_two is documented as undefined for 0. Fix it in the one caller that had this combination. The undefined behavior was detected by UBSAN: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 24 PID: 1075 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6+ #4 Hardware name: Abacus electric, s.r.o. - [email protected] Super Server/H12SSW-iN, BIOS 2.7 10/25/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x30 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0xec __roundup_pow_of_two+0x25/0x35 [bnxt_re] bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0xa1/0x470 [bnxt_re] bnxt_qplib_create_qp+0x19e/0x840 [bnxt_re] bnxt_re_create_qp+0x9b1/0xcd0 [bnxt_re] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kmalloc+0x1b6/0x4f0 ? create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_create_qp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_kernel+0x50/0xd0 [ib_core] create_mad_qp+0x8e/0xe0 [ib_core] ? __pfx_qp_event_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_core] ib_mad_init_device+0x2be/0x680 [ib_core] add_client_context+0x10d/0x1a0 [ib_core] enable_device_and_get+0xe0/0x1d0 [ib_core] ib_register_device+0x53c/0x630 [ib_core] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 bnxt_re_probe+0xbd8/0xe50 [bnxt_re] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_probe+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x49/0x80 ? driver_sysfs_add+0x57/0xc0 really_probe+0xde/0x340 ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90 ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0 bus_for_each_dev+0x8f/0xe0 bus_add_driver+0x146/0x220 driver_register+0x72/0xd0 __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6e/0xd0 ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] bnxt_re_mod_init+0x3e/0xff0 [bnxt_re] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x310 do_init_module+0x90/0x250 init_module_from_file+0x86/0xc0 idempotent_init_module+0x121/0x2b0 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x149/0x170 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x75/0x230 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __count_memcg_events+0x69/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x1a/0x30 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1f0/0x300 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x34e/0x640 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f4e5132821d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e3 db 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffca9c906a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563ec8a8f130 RCX: 00007f4e5132821d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f4e518fa07d RDI: 000000000000003b RBP: 00007ffca9c90760 R08: 00007f4e513f6b20 R09: 00007ffca9c906f0 R10: 0000563ec8a8faa0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4e518fa07d R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000563ec8409e90 R15: 0000563ec8a8fa60 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- Fixes: 0c4dcd6 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Refactor hardware queue memory allocation") Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Acked-by: Selvin Xavier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 78cfd17) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]> # Conflicts: # drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c
PlaidCat
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Dec 19, 2024
Its used from trace__run(), for the 'perf trace' live mode, i.e. its
strace-like, non-perf.data file processing mode, the most common one.
The trace__run() function will set trace->host using machine__new_host()
that is supposed to give a machine instance representing the running
machine, and since we'll use perf_env__arch_strerrno() to get the right
errno -> string table, we need to use machine->env, so initialize it in
machine__new_host().
Before the patch:
(gdb) run trace --errno-summary -a sleep 1
<SNIP>
Summary of events:
gvfs-afc-volume (3187), 2 events, 0.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
pselect6 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00%
GUsbEventThread (3519), 2 events, 0.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
poll 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00%
<SNIP>
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
478 if (env->arch_strerrno == NULL)
(gdb) bt
#0 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
#1 0x00000000004b75d2 in thread__dump_stats (ttrace=0x14f58f0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4673
#2 0x00000000004b78bf in trace__fprintf_thread (fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>, thread=0x10fa0b0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0) at builtin-trace.c:4708
#3 0x00000000004b7ad9 in trace__fprintf_thread_summary (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4747
#4 0x00000000004b656e in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:4456
#5 0x00000000004ba43e in cmd_trace (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:5487
#6 0x00000000004c0414 in run_builtin (p=0xec3068 <commands+648>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:351
#7 0x00000000004c06bb in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:404
#8 0x00000000004c0814 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffdc4c, argv=0x7fffffffdc40) at perf.c:448
#9 0x00000000004c0b5d in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:560
(gdb)
After:
root@number:~# perf trace -a --errno-summary sleep 1
<SNIP>
pw-data-loop (2685), 1410 events, 16.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
epoll_wait 188 0 983.428 0.000 5.231 15.595 8.68%
ioctl 94 0 0.811 0.004 0.009 0.016 2.82%
read 188 0 0.322 0.001 0.002 0.006 5.15%
write 141 0 0.280 0.001 0.002 0.018 8.39%
timerfd_settime 94 0 0.138 0.001 0.001 0.007 6.47%
gnome-control-c (179406), 1848 events, 20.9%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
poll 222 0 959.577 0.000 4.322 21.414 11.40%
recvmsg 150 0 0.539 0.001 0.004 0.013 5.12%
write 300 0 0.442 0.001 0.001 0.007 3.29%
read 150 0 0.183 0.001 0.001 0.009 5.53%
getpid 102 0 0.101 0.000 0.001 0.008 7.82%
root@number:~#
Fixes: 54373b5 ("perf env: Introduce perf_env__arch_strerrno()")
Reported-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z0XffUgNSv_9OjOi@x1
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
PlaidCat
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Dec 19, 2024
…s_lock For storing a value to a queue attribute, the queue_attr_store function first freezes the queue (->q_usage_counter(io)) and then acquire ->sysfs_lock. This seems not correct as the usual ordering should be to acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. This incorrect ordering causes the following lockdep splat which we are able to reproduce always simply by accessing /sys/kernel/debug file using ls command: [ 57.597146] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 57.597154] 6.12.0-10553-gb86545e02e8c #20 Tainted: G W [ 57.597162] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 57.597168] ls/4605 is trying to acquire lock: [ 57.597176] c00000003eb56710 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: __might_fault+0x58/0xc0 [ 57.597200] but task is already holding lock: [ 57.597207] c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 [ 57.597226] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 57.597233] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 57.597241] -> #5 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597255] down_write+0x6c/0x18c [ 57.597264] start_creating+0xb4/0x24c [ 57.597274] debugfs_create_dir+0x2c/0x1e8 [ 57.597283] blk_register_queue+0xec/0x294 [ 57.597292] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597302] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597309] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597317] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597326] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597334] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597342] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597350] -> #4 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597362] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597370] blk_register_queue+0xd4/0x294 [ 57.597379] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597388] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597395] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597402] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597410] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597418] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597426] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597434] -> #3 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597446] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597454] queue_attr_store+0x9c/0x110 [ 57.597462] sysfs_kf_write+0x70/0xb0 [ 57.597471] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x2ac [ 57.597480] vfs_write+0x3dc/0x6e8 [ 57.597488] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597495] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597504] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597516] -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#21){++++}-{0:0}: [ 57.597530] __submit_bio+0x5ec/0x828 [ 57.597538] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1e4/0x4f0 [ 57.597547] iomap_readahead+0x2a0/0x448 [ 57.597556] xfs_vm_readahead+0x28/0x3c [ 57.597564] read_pages+0x88/0x41c [ 57.597571] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ac/0x2d8 [ 57.597580] filemap_get_pages+0x188/0x984 [ 57.597588] filemap_read+0x13c/0x4bc [ 57.597596] xfs_file_buffered_read+0x88/0x17c [ 57.597605] xfs_file_read_iter+0xac/0x158 [ 57.597614] vfs_read+0x2d4/0x3b4 [ 57.597622] ksys_read+0x84/0x144 [ 57.597629] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597637] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597647] -> #1 (mapping.invalidate_lock#2){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597661] down_read+0x6c/0x220 [ 57.597669] filemap_fault+0x870/0x100c [ 57.597677] xfs_filemap_fault+0xc4/0x18c [ 57.597684] __do_fault+0x64/0x164 [ 57.597693] __handle_mm_fault+0x1274/0x1dac [ 57.597702] handle_mm_fault+0x248/0x484 [ 57.597711] ___do_page_fault+0x428/0xc0c [ 57.597719] hash__do_page_fault+0x30/0x68 [ 57.597727] do_hash_fault+0x90/0x35c [ 57.597736] data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220 [ 57.597745] _copy_from_user+0xf8/0x19c [ 57.597754] sel_write_load+0x178/0xd54 [ 57.597762] vfs_write+0x108/0x6e8 [ 57.597769] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597777] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597785] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597794] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597806] __lock_acquire+0x17cc/0x2330 [ 57.597814] lock_acquire+0x138/0x400 [ 57.597822] __might_fault+0x7c/0xc0 [ 57.597830] filldir64+0xe8/0x390 [ 57.597839] dcache_readdir+0x80/0x2d4 [ 57.597846] iterate_dir+0xd8/0x1d4 [ 57.597855] sys_getdents64+0x88/0x2d4 [ 57.597864] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597872] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597881] other info that might help us debug this: [ 57.597888] Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_lock --> &q->debugfs_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3 [ 57.597905] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 57.597911] CPU0 CPU1 [ 57.597917] ---- ---- [ 57.597922] rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597932] lock(&q->debugfs_mutex); [ 57.597940] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597950] rlock(&mm->mmap_lock); [ 57.597958] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 57.597965] 2 locks held by ls/4605: [ 57.597971] #0: c0000000137c12f8 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0xcc/0x154 [ 57.597989] #1: c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 Prevent the above lockdep warning by acquiring ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue while storing a queue attribute in queue_attr_store function. Later, we also found[1] another function __blk_mq_update_nr_ hw_queues where we first freeze queue and then acquire the ->sysfs_lock. So we've also updated lock ordering in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues function and ensured that in all code paths we follow the correct lock ordering i.e. acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAFj5m9Ke8+EHKQBs_Nk6hqd=LGXtk4mUxZUN5==ZcCjnZSBwHw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: af28141 ("block: freeze the queue in queue_attr_store") Tested-by: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
gvrose8192
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 13, 2025
jira VULN-6730 cve CVE-2023-4921 commit-author valis <[email protected]> commit 8fc134f When the plug qdisc is used as a class of the qfq qdisc it could trigger a UAF. This issue can be reproduced with following commands: tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: qfq tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 qfq weight 1 maxpkt 512 tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2: plug tc filter add dev lo parent 1: basic classid 1:1 ping -c1 127.0.0.1 and boom: [ 285.353793] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.354910] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880bad312a8 by task ping/144 [ 285.355903] [ 285.356165] CPU: 1 PID: 144 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #4 [ 285.357112] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 [ 285.358376] Call Trace: [ 285.358773] <IRQ> [ 285.359109] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x60 [ 285.359708] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 [ 285.360611] kasan_report+0x10c/0x120 [ 285.361195] ? qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.361780] qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.362342] __qdisc_run+0xf1/0x970 [ 285.362903] net_tx_action+0x28e/0x460 [ 285.363502] __do_softirq+0x11b/0x3de [ 285.364097] do_softirq.part.0+0x72/0x90 [ 285.364721] </IRQ> [ 285.365072] <TASK> [ 285.365422] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x77/0x90 [ 285.366079] __dev_queue_xmit+0x95f/0x1550 [ 285.366732] ? __pfx_csum_and_copy_from_iter+0x10/0x10 [ 285.367526] ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10 [ 285.368259] ? __build_skb_around+0x129/0x190 [ 285.368960] ? ip_generic_getfrag+0x12c/0x170 [ 285.369653] ? __pfx_ip_generic_getfrag+0x10/0x10 [ 285.370390] ? csum_partial+0x8/0x20 [ 285.370961] ? raw_getfrag+0xe5/0x140 [ 285.371559] ip_finish_output2+0x539/0xa40 [ 285.372222] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10 [ 285.372954] ip_output+0x113/0x1e0 [ 285.373512] ? __pfx_ip_output+0x10/0x10 [ 285.374130] ? icmp_out_count+0x49/0x60 [ 285.374739] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10 [ 285.375457] ip_push_pending_frames+0xf3/0x100 [ 285.376173] raw_sendmsg+0xef5/0x12d0 [ 285.376760] ? do_syscall_64+0x40/0x90 [ 285.377359] ? __static_call_text_end+0x136578/0x136578 [ 285.378173] ? do_syscall_64+0x40/0x90 [ 285.378772] ? kasan_enable_current+0x11/0x20 [ 285.379469] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 285.380137] ? __sock_create+0x13e/0x270 [ 285.380673] ? __sys_socket+0xf3/0x180 [ 285.381174] ? __x64_sys_socket+0x3d/0x50 [ 285.381725] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.382425] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x48/0x70 [ 285.382975] ? ip4_datagram_release_cb+0xd8/0x380 [ 285.383608] ? __pfx_ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x10/0x10 [ 285.384295] ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 [ 285.384844] ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x76/0x140 [ 285.385467] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x87/0xe0 [ 285.386014] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 [ 285.386645] ? release_sock+0xa0/0xd0 [ 285.387148] ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 [ 285.387712] ? freeze_secondary_cpus+0x348/0x3c0 [ 285.388341] ? aa_sk_perm+0x177/0x390 [ 285.388856] ? __pfx_aa_sk_perm+0x10/0x10 [ 285.389441] ? check_stack_object+0x22/0x70 [ 285.390032] ? inet_send_prepare+0x2f/0x120 [ 285.390603] ? __pfx_inet_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 285.391172] sock_sendmsg+0xcc/0xe0 [ 285.391667] __sys_sendto+0x190/0x230 [ 285.392168] ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10 [ 285.392727] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x30 [ 285.393328] ? set_normalized_timespec64+0x57/0x70 [ 285.393980] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x1b/0x40 [ 285.394578] ? __x64_sys_clock_gettime+0x11c/0x160 [ 285.395225] ? __pfx___x64_sys_clock_gettime+0x10/0x10 [ 285.395908] ? _copy_to_user+0x3e/0x60 [ 285.396432] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1a/0x120 [ 285.397086] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x50 [ 285.397734] ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x90 [ 285.398258] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 [ 285.398786] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x90 [ 285.399273] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1a/0x120 [ 285.399949] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x50 [ 285.400605] ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x90 [ 285.401124] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.401807] RIP: 0033:0x495726 [ 285.402233] Code: ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 11 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 09 [ 285.404683] RSP: 002b:00007ffcc25fb618 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 285.405677] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000495726 [ 285.406628] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000002518750 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 285.407565] RBP: 00000000005205ef R08: 00000000005f8838 R09: 000000000000001c [ 285.408523] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000002517634 [ 285.409460] R13: 00007ffcc25fb6f0 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 285.410403] </TASK> [ 285.410704] [ 285.410929] Allocated by task 144: [ 285.411402] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 285.411926] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 285.412442] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x55/0x70 [ 285.412973] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x187/0x3d0 [ 285.413567] __alloc_skb+0x1b4/0x230 [ 285.414060] __ip_append_data+0x17f7/0x1b60 [ 285.414633] ip_append_data+0x97/0xf0 [ 285.415144] raw_sendmsg+0x5a8/0x12d0 [ 285.415640] sock_sendmsg+0xcc/0xe0 [ 285.416117] __sys_sendto+0x190/0x230 [ 285.416626] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 [ 285.417145] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x90 [ 285.417624] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.418306] [ 285.418531] Freed by task 144: [ 285.418960] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 285.419469] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 285.419988] kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 [ 285.420556] ____kasan_slab_free+0x109/0x1a0 [ 285.421146] kmem_cache_free+0x1c2/0x450 [ 285.421680] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2ce/0x1870 [ 285.422333] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x97/0x140 [ 285.423003] process_backlog+0x100/0x2f0 [ 285.423537] __napi_poll+0x5c/0x2d0 [ 285.424023] net_rx_action+0x2be/0x560 [ 285.424510] __do_softirq+0x11b/0x3de [ 285.425034] [ 285.425254] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880bad31280 [ 285.425254] which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 [ 285.426993] The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of [ 285.426993] freed 224-byte region [ffff8880bad31280, ffff8880bad31360) [ 285.428572] [ 285.428798] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 285.429540] page:00000000f4b77674 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xbad31 [ 285.430758] flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) [ 285.431447] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 285.431934] raw: 0100000000000200 ffff88810094a8c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 285.432757] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 285.433562] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 285.434144] [ 285.434320] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 285.434828] ffff8880bad31180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.435580] ffff8880bad31200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.436264] >ffff8880bad31280: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 285.436777] ^ [ 285.437106] ffff8880bad31300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 285.437616] ffff8880bad31380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.438126] ================================================================== [ 285.438662] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fix this by: 1. Changing sch_plug's .peek handler to qdisc_peek_dequeued(), a function compatible with non-work-conserving qdiscs 2. Checking the return value of qdisc_dequeue_peeked() in sch_qfq. Fixes: 462dbc9 ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost") Reported-by: valis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: valis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 8fc134f) Signed-off-by: Greg Rose <[email protected]>
This was referenced Jan 13, 2025
gvrose8192
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 13, 2025
jira VULN-6730 cve CVE-2023-4921 commit-author valis <[email protected]> commit 8fc134f When the plug qdisc is used as a class of the qfq qdisc it could trigger a UAF. This issue can be reproduced with following commands: tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: qfq tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 qfq weight 1 maxpkt 512 tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2: plug tc filter add dev lo parent 1: basic classid 1:1 ping -c1 127.0.0.1 and boom: [ 285.353793] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.354910] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880bad312a8 by task ping/144 [ 285.355903] [ 285.356165] CPU: 1 PID: 144 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #4 [ 285.357112] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 [ 285.358376] Call Trace: [ 285.358773] <IRQ> [ 285.359109] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x60 [ 285.359708] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 [ 285.360611] kasan_report+0x10c/0x120 [ 285.361195] ? qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.361780] qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.362342] __qdisc_run+0xf1/0x970 [ 285.362903] net_tx_action+0x28e/0x460 [ 285.363502] __do_softirq+0x11b/0x3de [ 285.364097] do_softirq.part.0+0x72/0x90 [ 285.364721] </IRQ> [ 285.365072] <TASK> [ 285.365422] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x77/0x90 [ 285.366079] __dev_queue_xmit+0x95f/0x1550 [ 285.366732] ? __pfx_csum_and_copy_from_iter+0x10/0x10 [ 285.367526] ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10 [ 285.368259] ? __build_skb_around+0x129/0x190 [ 285.368960] ? ip_generic_getfrag+0x12c/0x170 [ 285.369653] ? __pfx_ip_generic_getfrag+0x10/0x10 [ 285.370390] ? csum_partial+0x8/0x20 [ 285.370961] ? raw_getfrag+0xe5/0x140 [ 285.371559] ip_finish_output2+0x539/0xa40 [ 285.372222] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10 [ 285.372954] ip_output+0x113/0x1e0 [ 285.373512] ? __pfx_ip_output+0x10/0x10 [ 285.374130] ? icmp_out_count+0x49/0x60 [ 285.374739] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10 [ 285.375457] ip_push_pending_frames+0xf3/0x100 [ 285.376173] raw_sendmsg+0xef5/0x12d0 [ 285.376760] ? do_syscall_64+0x40/0x90 [ 285.377359] ? __static_call_text_end+0x136578/0x136578 [ 285.378173] ? do_syscall_64+0x40/0x90 [ 285.378772] ? kasan_enable_current+0x11/0x20 [ 285.379469] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 285.380137] ? __sock_create+0x13e/0x270 [ 285.380673] ? __sys_socket+0xf3/0x180 [ 285.381174] ? __x64_sys_socket+0x3d/0x50 [ 285.381725] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.382425] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x48/0x70 [ 285.382975] ? ip4_datagram_release_cb+0xd8/0x380 [ 285.383608] ? __pfx_ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x10/0x10 [ 285.384295] ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 [ 285.384844] ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x76/0x140 [ 285.385467] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x87/0xe0 [ 285.386014] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 [ 285.386645] ? release_sock+0xa0/0xd0 [ 285.387148] ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 [ 285.387712] ? freeze_secondary_cpus+0x348/0x3c0 [ 285.388341] ? aa_sk_perm+0x177/0x390 [ 285.388856] ? __pfx_aa_sk_perm+0x10/0x10 [ 285.389441] ? check_stack_object+0x22/0x70 [ 285.390032] ? inet_send_prepare+0x2f/0x120 [ 285.390603] ? __pfx_inet_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 285.391172] sock_sendmsg+0xcc/0xe0 [ 285.391667] __sys_sendto+0x190/0x230 [ 285.392168] ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10 [ 285.392727] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x30 [ 285.393328] ? set_normalized_timespec64+0x57/0x70 [ 285.393980] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x1b/0x40 [ 285.394578] ? __x64_sys_clock_gettime+0x11c/0x160 [ 285.395225] ? __pfx___x64_sys_clock_gettime+0x10/0x10 [ 285.395908] ? _copy_to_user+0x3e/0x60 [ 285.396432] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1a/0x120 [ 285.397086] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x50 [ 285.397734] ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x90 [ 285.398258] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 [ 285.398786] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x90 [ 285.399273] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1a/0x120 [ 285.399949] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x50 [ 285.400605] ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x90 [ 285.401124] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.401807] RIP: 0033:0x495726 [ 285.402233] Code: ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 11 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 09 [ 285.404683] RSP: 002b:00007ffcc25fb618 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 285.405677] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000495726 [ 285.406628] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000002518750 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 285.407565] RBP: 00000000005205ef R08: 00000000005f8838 R09: 000000000000001c [ 285.408523] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000002517634 [ 285.409460] R13: 00007ffcc25fb6f0 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 285.410403] </TASK> [ 285.410704] [ 285.410929] Allocated by task 144: [ 285.411402] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 285.411926] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 285.412442] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x55/0x70 [ 285.412973] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x187/0x3d0 [ 285.413567] __alloc_skb+0x1b4/0x230 [ 285.414060] __ip_append_data+0x17f7/0x1b60 [ 285.414633] ip_append_data+0x97/0xf0 [ 285.415144] raw_sendmsg+0x5a8/0x12d0 [ 285.415640] sock_sendmsg+0xcc/0xe0 [ 285.416117] __sys_sendto+0x190/0x230 [ 285.416626] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 [ 285.417145] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x90 [ 285.417624] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.418306] [ 285.418531] Freed by task 144: [ 285.418960] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 285.419469] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 285.419988] kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 [ 285.420556] ____kasan_slab_free+0x109/0x1a0 [ 285.421146] kmem_cache_free+0x1c2/0x450 [ 285.421680] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2ce/0x1870 [ 285.422333] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x97/0x140 [ 285.423003] process_backlog+0x100/0x2f0 [ 285.423537] __napi_poll+0x5c/0x2d0 [ 285.424023] net_rx_action+0x2be/0x560 [ 285.424510] __do_softirq+0x11b/0x3de [ 285.425034] [ 285.425254] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880bad31280 [ 285.425254] which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 [ 285.426993] The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of [ 285.426993] freed 224-byte region [ffff8880bad31280, ffff8880bad31360) [ 285.428572] [ 285.428798] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 285.429540] page:00000000f4b77674 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xbad31 [ 285.430758] flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) [ 285.431447] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 285.431934] raw: 0100000000000200 ffff88810094a8c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 285.432757] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 285.433562] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 285.434144] [ 285.434320] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 285.434828] ffff8880bad31180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.435580] ffff8880bad31200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.436264] >ffff8880bad31280: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 285.436777] ^ [ 285.437106] ffff8880bad31300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 285.437616] ffff8880bad31380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.438126] ================================================================== [ 285.438662] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fix this by: 1. Changing sch_plug's .peek handler to qdisc_peek_dequeued(), a function compatible with non-work-conserving qdiscs 2. Checking the return value of qdisc_dequeue_peeked() in sch_qfq. Fixes: 462dbc9 ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost") Reported-by: valis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: valis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 8fc134f) Signed-off-by: Greg Rose <[email protected]>
gvrose8192
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 14, 2025
jira VULN-6730 cve CVE-2023-4921 commit-author valis <[email protected]> commit 8fc134f When the plug qdisc is used as a class of the qfq qdisc it could trigger a UAF. This issue can be reproduced with following commands: tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: qfq tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 qfq weight 1 maxpkt 512 tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2: plug tc filter add dev lo parent 1: basic classid 1:1 ping -c1 127.0.0.1 and boom: [ 285.353793] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.354910] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880bad312a8 by task ping/144 [ 285.355903] [ 285.356165] CPU: 1 PID: 144 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #4 [ 285.357112] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 [ 285.358376] Call Trace: [ 285.358773] <IRQ> [ 285.359109] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x60 [ 285.359708] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 [ 285.360611] kasan_report+0x10c/0x120 [ 285.361195] ? qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.361780] qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.362342] __qdisc_run+0xf1/0x970 [ 285.362903] net_tx_action+0x28e/0x460 [ 285.363502] __do_softirq+0x11b/0x3de [ 285.364097] do_softirq.part.0+0x72/0x90 [ 285.364721] </IRQ> [ 285.365072] <TASK> [ 285.365422] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x77/0x90 [ 285.366079] __dev_queue_xmit+0x95f/0x1550 [ 285.366732] ? __pfx_csum_and_copy_from_iter+0x10/0x10 [ 285.367526] ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10 [ 285.368259] ? __build_skb_around+0x129/0x190 [ 285.368960] ? ip_generic_getfrag+0x12c/0x170 [ 285.369653] ? __pfx_ip_generic_getfrag+0x10/0x10 [ 285.370390] ? csum_partial+0x8/0x20 [ 285.370961] ? raw_getfrag+0xe5/0x140 [ 285.371559] ip_finish_output2+0x539/0xa40 [ 285.372222] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10 [ 285.372954] ip_output+0x113/0x1e0 [ 285.373512] ? __pfx_ip_output+0x10/0x10 [ 285.374130] ? icmp_out_count+0x49/0x60 [ 285.374739] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10 [ 285.375457] ip_push_pending_frames+0xf3/0x100 [ 285.376173] raw_sendmsg+0xef5/0x12d0 [ 285.376760] ? do_syscall_64+0x40/0x90 [ 285.377359] ? __static_call_text_end+0x136578/0x136578 [ 285.378173] ? do_syscall_64+0x40/0x90 [ 285.378772] ? kasan_enable_current+0x11/0x20 [ 285.379469] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 285.380137] ? __sock_create+0x13e/0x270 [ 285.380673] ? __sys_socket+0xf3/0x180 [ 285.381174] ? __x64_sys_socket+0x3d/0x50 [ 285.381725] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.382425] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x48/0x70 [ 285.382975] ? ip4_datagram_release_cb+0xd8/0x380 [ 285.383608] ? __pfx_ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x10/0x10 [ 285.384295] ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 [ 285.384844] ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x76/0x140 [ 285.385467] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x87/0xe0 [ 285.386014] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 [ 285.386645] ? release_sock+0xa0/0xd0 [ 285.387148] ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 [ 285.387712] ? freeze_secondary_cpus+0x348/0x3c0 [ 285.388341] ? aa_sk_perm+0x177/0x390 [ 285.388856] ? __pfx_aa_sk_perm+0x10/0x10 [ 285.389441] ? check_stack_object+0x22/0x70 [ 285.390032] ? inet_send_prepare+0x2f/0x120 [ 285.390603] ? __pfx_inet_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 285.391172] sock_sendmsg+0xcc/0xe0 [ 285.391667] __sys_sendto+0x190/0x230 [ 285.392168] ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10 [ 285.392727] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x30 [ 285.393328] ? set_normalized_timespec64+0x57/0x70 [ 285.393980] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x1b/0x40 [ 285.394578] ? __x64_sys_clock_gettime+0x11c/0x160 [ 285.395225] ? __pfx___x64_sys_clock_gettime+0x10/0x10 [ 285.395908] ? _copy_to_user+0x3e/0x60 [ 285.396432] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1a/0x120 [ 285.397086] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x50 [ 285.397734] ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x90 [ 285.398258] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 [ 285.398786] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x90 [ 285.399273] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1a/0x120 [ 285.399949] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x50 [ 285.400605] ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x90 [ 285.401124] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.401807] RIP: 0033:0x495726 [ 285.402233] Code: ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 11 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 09 [ 285.404683] RSP: 002b:00007ffcc25fb618 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 285.405677] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000495726 [ 285.406628] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000002518750 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 285.407565] RBP: 00000000005205ef R08: 00000000005f8838 R09: 000000000000001c [ 285.408523] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000002517634 [ 285.409460] R13: 00007ffcc25fb6f0 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 285.410403] </TASK> [ 285.410704] [ 285.410929] Allocated by task 144: [ 285.411402] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 285.411926] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 285.412442] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x55/0x70 [ 285.412973] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x187/0x3d0 [ 285.413567] __alloc_skb+0x1b4/0x230 [ 285.414060] __ip_append_data+0x17f7/0x1b60 [ 285.414633] ip_append_data+0x97/0xf0 [ 285.415144] raw_sendmsg+0x5a8/0x12d0 [ 285.415640] sock_sendmsg+0xcc/0xe0 [ 285.416117] __sys_sendto+0x190/0x230 [ 285.416626] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 [ 285.417145] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x90 [ 285.417624] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.418306] [ 285.418531] Freed by task 144: [ 285.418960] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 285.419469] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 285.419988] kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 [ 285.420556] ____kasan_slab_free+0x109/0x1a0 [ 285.421146] kmem_cache_free+0x1c2/0x450 [ 285.421680] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2ce/0x1870 [ 285.422333] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x97/0x140 [ 285.423003] process_backlog+0x100/0x2f0 [ 285.423537] __napi_poll+0x5c/0x2d0 [ 285.424023] net_rx_action+0x2be/0x560 [ 285.424510] __do_softirq+0x11b/0x3de [ 285.425034] [ 285.425254] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880bad31280 [ 285.425254] which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 [ 285.426993] The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of [ 285.426993] freed 224-byte region [ffff8880bad31280, ffff8880bad31360) [ 285.428572] [ 285.428798] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 285.429540] page:00000000f4b77674 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xbad31 [ 285.430758] flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) [ 285.431447] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 285.431934] raw: 0100000000000200 ffff88810094a8c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 285.432757] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 285.433562] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 285.434144] [ 285.434320] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 285.434828] ffff8880bad31180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.435580] ffff8880bad31200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.436264] >ffff8880bad31280: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 285.436777] ^ [ 285.437106] ffff8880bad31300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 285.437616] ffff8880bad31380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.438126] ================================================================== [ 285.438662] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fix this by: 1. Changing sch_plug's .peek handler to qdisc_peek_dequeued(), a function compatible with non-work-conserving qdiscs 2. Checking the return value of qdisc_dequeue_peeked() in sch_qfq. Fixes: 462dbc9 ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost") Reported-by: valis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: valis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 8fc134f) Signed-off-by: Greg Rose <[email protected]>
pvts-mat
pushed a commit
to pvts-mat/kernel-src-tree
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 14, 2025
jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-5.14.0-284.30.1.rt14.315.el9_2 commit-author minoura makoto <[email protected]> commit b18cba0 Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to __gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined. When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for. Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet. We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs are executed in parallel. The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9 kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/ elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7. PID: 71258 TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000 CPU: 36 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f ctrliq#1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9 ctrliq#2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss] ctrliq#3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc [sunrpc] ctrliq#4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss] ctrliq#5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc] ctrliq#6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc] ctrliq#7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc] ctrliq#8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc] ctrliq#9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc] The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe. When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for B in pipe->in_downcall. And the process waiting for the msg corresponding to service A will be woken up. Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the next msg. In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A). The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that. This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon receiving a downcall. Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <[email protected]> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <[email protected]> Cc: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit b18cba0) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
pvts-mat
pushed a commit
to pvts-mat/kernel-src-tree
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 14, 2025
jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-5.14.0-284.30.1.rt14.315.el9_2 commit-author Stefan Assmann <[email protected]> commit 4e264be When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb ctrliq#1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d ctrliq#2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc ctrliq#3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 ctrliq#4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] ctrliq#5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 ctrliq#6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa ctrliq#7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc ctrliq#8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e ctrliq#9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 ctrliq#10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 ctrliq#11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] ctrliq#12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] ctrliq#13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] ctrliq#14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 ctrliq#15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 ctrliq#16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 ctrliq#17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 ctrliq#18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 ctrliq#19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc ctrliq#20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d ctrliq#21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 ctrliq#22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 4e264be) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
pvts-mat
pushed a commit
to pvts-mat/kernel-src-tree
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 14, 2025
jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-5.14.0-284.30.1.rt14.315.el9_2 commit-author Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> commit 6d65028 As reported by Alan, the CFI (Call Frame Information) in the VDSO time routines is incorrect since commit ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation."). DWARF has a concept called the CFA (Canonical Frame Address), which on powerpc is calculated as an offset from the stack pointer (r1). That means when the stack pointer is changed there must be a corresponding CFI directive to update the calculation of the CFA. The current code is missing those directives for the changes to r1, which prevents gdb from being able to generate a backtrace from inside VDSO functions, eg: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () ctrliq#1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 ctrliq#2 0x00007fffffffd960 in ?? () ctrliq#3 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 Backtrace stopped: frame did not save the PC Alan helpfully describes some rules for correctly maintaining the CFI information: 1) Every adjustment to the current frame address reg (ie. r1) must be described, and exactly at the instruction where r1 changes. Why? Because stack unwinding might want to access previous frames. 2) If a function changes LR or any non-volatile register, the save location for those regs must be given. The CFI can be at any instruction after the saves up to the point that the reg is changed. (Exception: LR save should be described before a bl. not after) 3) If asychronous unwind info is needed then restores of LR and non-volatile regs must also be described. The CFI can be at any instruction after the reg is restored up to the point where the save location is (potentially) trashed. Fix the inability to backtrace by adding CFI directives describing the changes to r1, ie. satisfying rule 1. Also change the information for LR to point to the copy saved on the stack, not the value in r0 that will be overwritten by the function call. Finally, add CFI directives describing the save/restore of r2. With the fix gdb can correctly back trace and navigate up and down the stack: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () ctrliq#1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 ctrliq#2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () ctrliq#3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () ctrliq#4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () ctrliq#5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) up ctrliq#1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) ctrliq#2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) ctrliq#3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) ctrliq#4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) ctrliq#5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) Initial frame selected; you cannot go up. (gdb) down ctrliq#4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) ctrliq#3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) ctrliq#2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) ctrliq#1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) Fixes: ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation.") Cc: [email protected] # v5.11+ Reported-by: Alan Modra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 6d65028) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
pvts-mat
pushed a commit
to pvts-mat/kernel-src-tree
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 14, 2025
jira LE-1907 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-5.14.0-284.30.1.rt14.315.el9_2 commit-author Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]> commit de9df6c Currently, the per cpu upcall counters are allocated after the vport is created and inserted into the system. This could lead to the datapath accessing the counters before they are allocated resulting in a kernel Oops. Here is an example: PID: 59693 TASK: ffff0005f4f51500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ovs-vswitchd" #0 [ffff80000a39b5b0] __switch_to at ffffb70f0629f2f4 ctrliq#1 [ffff80000a39b5d0] __schedule at ffffb70f0629f5cc ctrliq#2 [ffff80000a39b650] preempt_schedule_common at ffffb70f0629fa60 ctrliq#3 [ffff80000a39b670] dynamic_might_resched at ffffb70f0629fb58 ctrliq#4 [ffff80000a39b680] mutex_lock_killable at ffffb70f062a1388 ctrliq#5 [ffff80000a39b6a0] pcpu_alloc at ffffb70f0594460c ctrliq#6 [ffff80000a39b750] __alloc_percpu_gfp at ffffb70f05944e68 ctrliq#7 [ffff80000a39b760] ovs_vport_cmd_new at ffffb70ee6961b90 [openvswitch] ... PID: 58682 TASK: ffff0005b2f0bf00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [ffff80000a5d2f40] machine_kexec at ffffb70f056a0758 ctrliq#1 [ffff80000a5d2f70] __crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2994 ctrliq#2 [ffff80000a5d3100] crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2ad8 ctrliq#3 [ffff80000a5d3120] die at ffffb70f0628234c ctrliq#4 [ffff80000a5d31e0] die_kernel_fault at ffffb70f062828a8 ctrliq#5 [ffff80000a5d3210] __do_kernel_fault at ffffb70f056a31f4 ctrliq#6 [ffff80000a5d3240] do_bad_area at ffffb70f056a32a4 ctrliq#7 [ffff80000a5d3260] do_translation_fault at ffffb70f062a9710 ctrliq#8 [ffff80000a5d3270] do_mem_abort at ffffb70f056a2f74 ctrliq#9 [ffff80000a5d32a0] el1_abort at ffffb70f06297dac ctrliq#10 [ffff80000a5d32d0] el1h_64_sync_handler at ffffb70f06299b24 ctrliq#11 [ffff80000a5d3410] el1h_64_sync at ffffb70f056812dc ctrliq#12 [ffff80000a5d3430] ovs_dp_upcall at ffffb70ee6963c84 [openvswitch] ctrliq#13 [ffff80000a5d3470] ovs_dp_process_packet at ffffb70ee6963fdc [openvswitch] ctrliq#14 [ffff80000a5d34f0] ovs_vport_receive at ffffb70ee6972c78 [openvswitch] ctrliq#15 [ffff80000a5d36f0] netdev_port_receive at ffffb70ee6973948 [openvswitch] ctrliq#16 [ffff80000a5d3720] netdev_frame_hook at ffffb70ee6973a28 [openvswitch] ctrliq#17 [ffff80000a5d3730] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 at ffffb70f06079f90 We moved the per cpu upcall counter allocation to the existing vport alloc and free functions to solve this. Fixes: 95637d9 ("net: openvswitch: release vport resources on failure") Fixes: 1933ea3 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets") Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit de9df6c) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
gvrose8192
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 16, 2025
jira VULN-6730 cve CVE-2023-4921 commit-author valis <[email protected]> commit 8fc134f When the plug qdisc is used as a class of the qfq qdisc it could trigger a UAF. This issue can be reproduced with following commands: tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: qfq tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 qfq weight 1 maxpkt 512 tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2: plug tc filter add dev lo parent 1: basic classid 1:1 ping -c1 127.0.0.1 and boom: [ 285.353793] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.354910] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880bad312a8 by task ping/144 [ 285.355903] [ 285.356165] CPU: 1 PID: 144 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #4 [ 285.357112] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 [ 285.358376] Call Trace: [ 285.358773] <IRQ> [ 285.359109] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x60 [ 285.359708] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 [ 285.360611] kasan_report+0x10c/0x120 [ 285.361195] ? qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.361780] qfq_dequeue+0xa7/0x7f0 [ 285.362342] __qdisc_run+0xf1/0x970 [ 285.362903] net_tx_action+0x28e/0x460 [ 285.363502] __do_softirq+0x11b/0x3de [ 285.364097] do_softirq.part.0+0x72/0x90 [ 285.364721] </IRQ> [ 285.365072] <TASK> [ 285.365422] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x77/0x90 [ 285.366079] __dev_queue_xmit+0x95f/0x1550 [ 285.366732] ? __pfx_csum_and_copy_from_iter+0x10/0x10 [ 285.367526] ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10 [ 285.368259] ? __build_skb_around+0x129/0x190 [ 285.368960] ? ip_generic_getfrag+0x12c/0x170 [ 285.369653] ? __pfx_ip_generic_getfrag+0x10/0x10 [ 285.370390] ? csum_partial+0x8/0x20 [ 285.370961] ? raw_getfrag+0xe5/0x140 [ 285.371559] ip_finish_output2+0x539/0xa40 [ 285.372222] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10 [ 285.372954] ip_output+0x113/0x1e0 [ 285.373512] ? __pfx_ip_output+0x10/0x10 [ 285.374130] ? icmp_out_count+0x49/0x60 [ 285.374739] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10 [ 285.375457] ip_push_pending_frames+0xf3/0x100 [ 285.376173] raw_sendmsg+0xef5/0x12d0 [ 285.376760] ? do_syscall_64+0x40/0x90 [ 285.377359] ? __static_call_text_end+0x136578/0x136578 [ 285.378173] ? do_syscall_64+0x40/0x90 [ 285.378772] ? kasan_enable_current+0x11/0x20 [ 285.379469] ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 285.380137] ? __sock_create+0x13e/0x270 [ 285.380673] ? __sys_socket+0xf3/0x180 [ 285.381174] ? __x64_sys_socket+0x3d/0x50 [ 285.381725] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.382425] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x48/0x70 [ 285.382975] ? ip4_datagram_release_cb+0xd8/0x380 [ 285.383608] ? __pfx_ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x10/0x10 [ 285.384295] ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 [ 285.384844] ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x76/0x140 [ 285.385467] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x87/0xe0 [ 285.386014] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 [ 285.386645] ? release_sock+0xa0/0xd0 [ 285.387148] ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 [ 285.387712] ? freeze_secondary_cpus+0x348/0x3c0 [ 285.388341] ? aa_sk_perm+0x177/0x390 [ 285.388856] ? __pfx_aa_sk_perm+0x10/0x10 [ 285.389441] ? check_stack_object+0x22/0x70 [ 285.390032] ? inet_send_prepare+0x2f/0x120 [ 285.390603] ? __pfx_inet_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 285.391172] sock_sendmsg+0xcc/0xe0 [ 285.391667] __sys_sendto+0x190/0x230 [ 285.392168] ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10 [ 285.392727] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x30 [ 285.393328] ? set_normalized_timespec64+0x57/0x70 [ 285.393980] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x1b/0x40 [ 285.394578] ? __x64_sys_clock_gettime+0x11c/0x160 [ 285.395225] ? __pfx___x64_sys_clock_gettime+0x10/0x10 [ 285.395908] ? _copy_to_user+0x3e/0x60 [ 285.396432] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1a/0x120 [ 285.397086] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x50 [ 285.397734] ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x90 [ 285.398258] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 [ 285.398786] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x90 [ 285.399273] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1a/0x120 [ 285.399949] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x50 [ 285.400605] ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x90 [ 285.401124] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.401807] RIP: 0033:0x495726 [ 285.402233] Code: ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 11 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 09 [ 285.404683] RSP: 002b:00007ffcc25fb618 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 285.405677] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000495726 [ 285.406628] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000002518750 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 285.407565] RBP: 00000000005205ef R08: 00000000005f8838 R09: 000000000000001c [ 285.408523] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000002517634 [ 285.409460] R13: 00007ffcc25fb6f0 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 285.410403] </TASK> [ 285.410704] [ 285.410929] Allocated by task 144: [ 285.411402] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 285.411926] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 285.412442] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x55/0x70 [ 285.412973] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x187/0x3d0 [ 285.413567] __alloc_skb+0x1b4/0x230 [ 285.414060] __ip_append_data+0x17f7/0x1b60 [ 285.414633] ip_append_data+0x97/0xf0 [ 285.415144] raw_sendmsg+0x5a8/0x12d0 [ 285.415640] sock_sendmsg+0xcc/0xe0 [ 285.416117] __sys_sendto+0x190/0x230 [ 285.416626] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 [ 285.417145] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x90 [ 285.417624] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 285.418306] [ 285.418531] Freed by task 144: [ 285.418960] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 285.419469] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 285.419988] kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 [ 285.420556] ____kasan_slab_free+0x109/0x1a0 [ 285.421146] kmem_cache_free+0x1c2/0x450 [ 285.421680] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2ce/0x1870 [ 285.422333] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x97/0x140 [ 285.423003] process_backlog+0x100/0x2f0 [ 285.423537] __napi_poll+0x5c/0x2d0 [ 285.424023] net_rx_action+0x2be/0x560 [ 285.424510] __do_softirq+0x11b/0x3de [ 285.425034] [ 285.425254] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880bad31280 [ 285.425254] which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 [ 285.426993] The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of [ 285.426993] freed 224-byte region [ffff8880bad31280, ffff8880bad31360) [ 285.428572] [ 285.428798] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 285.429540] page:00000000f4b77674 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xbad31 [ 285.430758] flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) [ 285.431447] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 285.431934] raw: 0100000000000200 ffff88810094a8c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 285.432757] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 285.433562] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 285.434144] [ 285.434320] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 285.434828] ffff8880bad31180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.435580] ffff8880bad31200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.436264] >ffff8880bad31280: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 285.436777] ^ [ 285.437106] ffff8880bad31300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 285.437616] ffff8880bad31380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 285.438126] ================================================================== [ 285.438662] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fix this by: 1. Changing sch_plug's .peek handler to qdisc_peek_dequeued(), a function compatible with non-work-conserving qdiscs 2. Checking the return value of qdisc_dequeue_peeked() in sch_qfq. Fixes: 462dbc9 ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost") Reported-by: valis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: valis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 8fc134f) Signed-off-by: Greg Rose <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 5, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-92761 Upstream Status: kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git commit 88f7f56 Author: Jinliang Zheng <[email protected]> Date: Thu Feb 20 19:20:14 2025 +0800 dm: fix unconditional IO throttle caused by REQ_PREFLUSH When a bio with REQ_PREFLUSH is submitted to dm, __send_empty_flush() generates a flush_bio with REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC, which causes the flush_bio to be throttled by wbt_wait(). An example from v5.4, similar problem also exists in upstream: crash> bt 2091206 PID: 2091206 TASK: ffff2050df92a300 CPU: 109 COMMAND: "kworker/u260:0" #0 [ffff800084a2f7f0] __switch_to at ffff80004008aeb8 #1 [ffff800084a2f820] __schedule at ffff800040bfa0c4 #2 [ffff800084a2f880] schedule at ffff800040bfa4b4 #3 [ffff800084a2f8a0] io_schedule at ffff800040bfa9c4 #4 [ffff800084a2f8c0] rq_qos_wait at ffff8000405925bc #5 [ffff800084a2f940] wbt_wait at ffff8000405bb3a0 #6 [ffff800084a2f9a0] __rq_qos_throttle at ffff800040592254 #7 [ffff800084a2f9c0] blk_mq_make_request at ffff80004057cf38 #8 [ffff800084a2fa60] generic_make_request at ffff800040570138 #9 [ffff800084a2fae0] submit_bio at ffff8000405703b4 #10 [ffff800084a2fb50] xlog_write_iclog at ffff800001280834 [xfs] #11 [ffff800084a2fbb0] xlog_sync at ffff800001280c3c [xfs] #12 [ffff800084a2fbf0] xlog_state_release_iclog at ffff800001280df4 [xfs] #13 [ffff800084a2fc10] xlog_write at ffff80000128203c [xfs] #14 [ffff800084a2fcd0] xlog_cil_push at ffff8000012846dc [xfs] #15 [ffff800084a2fda0] xlog_cil_push_work at ffff800001284a2c [xfs] #16 [ffff800084a2fdb0] process_one_work at ffff800040111d08 #17 [ffff800084a2fe00] worker_thread at ffff8000401121cc #18 [ffff800084a2fe70] kthread at ffff800040118de4 After commit 2def284 ("xfs: don't allow log IO to be throttled"), the metadata submitted by xlog_write_iclog() should not be throttled. But due to the existence of the dm layer, throttling flush_bio indirectly causes the metadata bio to be throttled. Fix this by conditionally adding REQ_IDLE to flush_bio.bi_opf, which makes wbt_should_throttle() return false to avoid wbt_wait(). Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tianxiang Peng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 5, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-77936 upstream ======== commit 2adbf53 Author: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Date: Mon Dec 23 19:28:13 2024 +0530 description =========== When kernel is built without debuginfo, running 'perf record' with --off-cpu results in segfault as below: ./perf record --off-cpu -e dummy sleep 1 libbpf: kernel BTF is missing at '/sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux', was CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF enabled? libbpf: failed to find '.BTF' ELF section in /lib/modules/6.13.0-rc3+/build/vmlinux libbpf: failed to find valid kernel BTF Segmentation fault (core dumped) The backtrace pointed to: #0 0x00000000100fb17c in btf.type_cnt () #1 0x00000000100fc1a8 in btf_find_by_name_kind () #2 0x00000000100fc38c in btf.find_by_name_kind () #3 0x00000000102ee3ac in off_cpu_prepare () #4 0x000000001002f78c in cmd_record () #5 0x00000000100aee78 in run_builtin () #6 0x00000000100af3e4 in handle_internal_command () #7 0x000000001001004c in main () Code sequence is: static void check_sched_switch_args(void) { struct btf *btf = btf__load_vmlinux_btf(); const struct btf_type *t1, *t2, *t3; u32 type_id; type_id = btf__find_by_name_kind(btf, "btf_trace_sched_switch", BTF_KIND_TYPEDEF); btf__load_vmlinux_btf() fails when CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF is not enabled. Here bpf__find_by_name_kind() calls btf__type_cnt() with NULL btf value and results in segfault. To fix this, add a check to see if btf is not NULL before invoking bpf__find_by_name_kind(). Reviewed-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Cc: Hari Bathini <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kajol Jain <[email protected]> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 5, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-77936 upstream ======== commit c7b87ce Author: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Date: Tue Jan 21 18:55:19 2025 -0800 description =========== libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr", idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6 elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is found by UBsan. The error message: $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1 builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]' #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966 #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110 #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436 #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897 #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335 #5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502 #6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351 #7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404 #8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448 #9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556 #10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6) 0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1) = 1 Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint") Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 5, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-77936 upstream ======== commit 888751e Author: Thomas Richter <[email protected]> Date: Fri Jan 31 12:24:00 2025 +0100 description =========== perf test 11 hwmon fails on s390 with this error # ./perf test -Fv 11 --- start --- ---- end ---- 11.1: Basic parsing test : Ok --- start --- Testing 'temp_test_hwmon_event1' Using CPUID IBM,3931,704,A01,3.7,002f temp_test_hwmon_event1 -> hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/ FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for 'temp_test_hwmon_event1', 292470092988416 != 655361 ---- end ---- 11.2: Parsing without PMU name : FAILED! --- start --- Testing 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/' FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/', 292470092988416 != 655361 ---- end ---- 11.3: Parsing with PMU name : FAILED! # The root cause is in member test_event::config which is initialized to 0xA0001 or 655361. During event parsing a long list event parsing functions are called and end up with this gdb call stack: #0 hwmon_pmu__config_term (hwm=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, term=0x168db60, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:623 #1 hwmon_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:662 #2 0x00000000012f870c in perf_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, zero=false, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1519 #3 0x00000000012f88a4 in perf_pmu__config (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, head_terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1545 #4 0x00000000012680c4 in parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, list=0x168dc00, pmu=0x168dfd0, const_parsed_terms=0x3ffffff6090, auto_merge_stats=true, alternate_hw_config=10) at util/parse-events.c:1508 #5 0x00000000012684c6 in parse_events_multi_pmu_add (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, event_name=0x168ec10 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", hw_config=10, const_parsed_terms=0x0, listp=0x3ffffff6230, loc_=0x3ffffff70e0) at util/parse-events.c:1592 #6 0x00000000012f0e4e in parse_events_parse (_parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, scanner=0x16878c0) at util/parse-events.y:293 #7 0x00000000012695a0 in parse_events__scanner (str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", input=0x0, parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8) at util/parse-events.c:1867 #8 0x000000000126a1e8 in __parse_events (evlist=0x168b580, str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", pmu_filter=0x0, err=0x3ffffff81c8, fake_pmu=false, warn_if_reordered=true, fake_tp=false) at util/parse-events.c:2136 #9 0x00000000011e36aa in parse_events (evlist=0x168b580, str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", err=0x3ffffff81c8) at /root/linux/tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41 #10 0x00000000011e3e64 in do_test (i=0, with_pmu=false, with_alias=false) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:164 #11 0x00000000011e422c in test__hwmon_pmu (with_pmu=false) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:219 #12 0x00000000011e431c in test__hwmon_pmu_without_pmu (test=0x1610368 <suite.hwmon_pmu>, subtest=1) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:23 where the attr::config is set to value 292470092988416 or 0x10a0000000000 in line 625 of file ./util/hwmon_pmu.c: attr->config = key.type_and_num; However member key::type_and_num is defined as union and bit field: union hwmon_pmu_event_key { long type_and_num; struct { int num :16; enum hwmon_type type :8; }; }; s390 is big endian and Intel is little endian architecture. The events for the hwmon dummy pmu have num = 1 or num = 2 and type is set to HWMON_TYPE_TEMP (which is 10). On s390 this assignes member key::type_and_num the value of 0x10a0000000000 (which is 292470092988416) as shown in above trace output. Fix this and export the structure/union hwmon_pmu_event_key so the test shares the same implementation as the event parsing functions for union and bit fields. This should avoid endianess issues on all platforms. Output after: # ./perf test -F 11 11.1: Basic parsing test : Ok 11.2: Parsing without PMU name : Ok 11.3: Parsing with PMU name : Ok # Fixes: 531ee0f ("perf test: Add hwmon "PMU" test") Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 5, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-78701 Upstream Status: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git commit 93ae6e6 Author: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Date: Wed Mar 19 10:21:01 2025 +0800 iommu/vt-d: Fix possible circular locking dependency We have recently seen report of lockdep circular lock dependency warnings on platforms like Skylake and Kabylake: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc6-CI_DRM_16276-gca2c04fe76e8+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8360ee48 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888102c7efa8 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #5 (dmar_global_lock){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x43/0x1d0 enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x21/0x110 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4c6/0x870 cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 irq_remap_enable_fault_handling+0x3f/0xa0 apic_intr_mode_init+0x5c/0x110 x86_late_time_init+0x24/0x40 start_kernel+0x895/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #4 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 mm_core_init+0x18/0x2c0 start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #3 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __cpuhp_state_add_instance+0x4f/0x220 iova_domain_init_rcaches+0x214/0x280 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x1a4/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #2 (&domain->iova_cookie->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x16b/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (&group->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __iommu_probe_device+0x24c/0x4e0 probe_iommu_group+0x2b/0x50 bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xe0 iommu_device_register+0xe1/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1637/0x2810 lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300 __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 intel_iommu_init+0xe90/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: iommu_probe_device_lock --> dmar_global_lock --> &device->physical_node_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(dmar_global_lock); lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(iommu_probe_device_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** This driver uses a global lock to protect the list of enumerated DMA remapping units. It is necessary due to the driver's support for dynamic addition and removal of remapping units at runtime. Two distinct code paths require iteration over this remapping unit list: - Device registration and probing: the driver iterates the list to register each remapping unit with the upper layer IOMMU framework and subsequently probe the devices managed by that unit. - Global configuration: Upper layer components may also iterate the list to apply configuration changes. The lock acquisition order between these two code paths was reversed. This caused lockdep warnings, indicating a risk of deadlock. Fix this warning by releasing the global lock before invoking upper layer interfaces for device registration. Fixes: b150654 ("iommu/vt-d: Fix suspicious RCU usage") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/SJ1PR11MB612953431F94F18C954C4A9CB9D32@SJ1PR11MB6129.namprd11.prod.outlook.com/ Tested-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eder Zulian <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 7, 2025
This patch enables support for DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_CALL_OPS on RISC-V. This allows each ftrace callsite to provide an ftrace_ops to the common ftrace trampoline, allowing each callsite to invoke distinct tracer functions without the need to fall back to list processing or to allocate custom trampolines for each callsite. This significantly speeds up cases where multiple distinct trace functions are used and callsites are mostly traced by a single tracer. The idea and most of the implementation is taken from the ARM64's implementation of the same feature. The idea is to place a pointer to the ftrace_ops as a literal at a fixed offset from the function entry point, which can be recovered by the common ftrace trampoline. We use -fpatchable-function-entry to reserve 8 bytes above the function entry by emitting 2 4 byte or 4 2 byte nops depending on the presence of CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_C. These 8 bytes are patched at runtime with a pointer to the associated ftrace_ops for that callsite. Functions are aligned to 8 bytes to make sure that the accesses to this literal are atomic. This approach allows for directly invoking ftrace_ops::func even for ftrace_ops which are dynamically-allocated (or part of a module), without going via ftrace_ops_list_func. We've benchamrked this with the ftrace_ops sample module on Spacemit K1 Jupiter: Without this patch: baseline (Linux rivos 6.14.0-09584-g7d06015d936c #3 SMP Sat Mar 29 +-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------+ | Number of tracers | Total time (ns) | Per-call average time | |-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------| | Relevant | Irrelevant | 100000 calls | Total (ns) | Overhead (ns) | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 0 | 0 | 1357958 | 13 | - | | 0 | 1 | 1302375 | 13 | - | | 0 | 2 | 1302375 | 13 | - | | 0 | 10 | 1379084 | 13 | - | | 0 | 100 | 1302458 | 13 | - | | 0 | 200 | 1302333 | 13 | - | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 13677833 | 136 | 123 | | 1 | 1 | 18500916 | 185 | 172 | | 1 | 2 | 2285645 | 228 | 215 | | 1 | 10 | 58824709 | 588 | 575 | | 1 | 100 | 505141584 | 5051 | 5038 | | 1 | 200 | 1580473126 | 15804 | 15791 | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 13561000 | 135 | 122 | | 2 | 0 | 19707292 | 197 | 184 | | 10 | 0 | 67774750 | 677 | 664 | | 100 | 0 | 714123125 | 7141 | 7128 | | 200 | 0 | 1918065668 | 19180 | 19167 | +----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------+ Note: per-call overhead is estimated relative to the baseline case with 0 relevant tracers and 0 irrelevant tracers. With this patch: v4-rc4 (Linux rivos 6.14.0-09598-gd75747611c93 #4 SMP Sat Mar 29 +-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------+ | Number of tracers | Total time (ns) | Per-call average time | |-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------| | Relevant | Irrelevant | 100000 calls | Total (ns) | Overhead (ns) | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 0 | 0 | 1459917 | 14 | - | | 0 | 1 | 1408000 | 14 | - | | 0 | 2 | 1383792 | 13 | - | | 0 | 10 | 1430709 | 14 | - | | 0 | 100 | 1383791 | 13 | - | | 0 | 200 | 1383750 | 13 | - | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 5238041 | 52 | 38 | | 1 | 1 | 5228542 | 52 | 38 | | 1 | 2 | 5325917 | 53 | 40 | | 1 | 10 | 5299667 | 52 | 38 | | 1 | 100 | 5245250 | 52 | 39 | | 1 | 200 | 5238459 | 52 | 39 | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 5239083 | 52 | 38 | | 2 | 0 | 19449417 | 194 | 181 | | 10 | 0 | 67718584 | 677 | 663 | | 100 | 0 | 709840708 | 7098 | 7085 | | 200 | 0 | 2203580626 | 22035 | 22022 | +----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------+ Note: per-call overhead is estimated relative to the baseline case with 0 relevant tracers and 0 irrelevant tracers. As can be seen from the above: a) Whenever there is a single relevant tracer function associated with a tracee, the overhead of invoking the tracer is constant, and does not scale with the number of tracers which are *not* associated with that tracee. b) The overhead for a single relevant tracer has dropped to ~1/3 of the overhead prior to this series (from 122ns to 38ns). This is largely due to permitting calls to dynamically-allocated ftrace_ops without going through ftrace_ops_list_func. Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <[email protected]> [update kconfig, asm, refactor] Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Björn Töpel <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 13, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-78931 CVE: CVE-2024-57980 commit c6ef3a7 Author: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2024 01:51:30 +0200 If the uvc_status_init() function fails to allocate the int_urb, it will free the dev->status pointer but doesn't reset the pointer to NULL. This results in the kfree() call in uvc_status_cleanup() trying to double-free the memory. Fix it by resetting the dev->status pointer to NULL after freeing it. Fixes: a31a405 ("V4L/DVB:usbvideo:don't use part of buffer for USB transfer #4") Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Reviewed by: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Desnes Nunes <[email protected]>
PlaidCat
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 18, 2025
jira LE-3201 cve CVE-2024-26880 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-4.18.0-553.22.1.rt7.363.el8_10 commit-author Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> commit 65e8fbd There is this reported crash when experimenting with the lvm2 testsuite. The list corruption is caused by the fact that the postsuspend and resume methods were not paired correctly; there were two consecutive calls to the origin_postsuspend function. The second call attempts to remove the "hash_list" entry from a list, while it was already removed by the first call. Fix __dm_internal_resume so that it calls the preresume and resume methods of the table's targets. If a preresume method of some target fails, we are in a tricky situation. We can't return an error because dm_internal_resume isn't supposed to return errors. We can't return success, because then the "resume" and "postsuspend" methods would not be paired correctly. So, we set the DMF_SUSPENDED flag and we fake normal suspend - it may confuse userspace tools, but it won't cause a kernel crash. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:56! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 1 PID: 8343 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6 #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0 <snip> RSP: 0018:ffff8881b831bcc0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffff888143b6eb80 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff819053d0 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff8881b83a3400 R08: 00000000fffeffff R09: 0000000000000058 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff81a24080 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff88814538e000 R14: ffff888143bc6dc0 R15: ffffffffa02e4bb0 FS: 00000000f7c0f780(0000) GS:ffff8893f0a40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000057fb5000 CR3: 0000000143474000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die+0x2d/0x80 ? do_trap+0xeb/0xf0 ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0 ? do_error_trap+0x60/0x80 ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x49/0x60 ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? table_deps+0x1b0/0x1b0 [dm_mod] ? __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x77/0xc0 origin_postsuspend+0x1a/0x50 [dm_snapshot] dm_table_postsuspend_targets+0x34/0x50 [dm_mod] dm_suspend+0xd8/0xf0 [dm_mod] dev_suspend+0x1f2/0x2f0 [dm_mod] ? table_deps+0x1b0/0x1b0 [dm_mod] ctl_ioctl+0x300/0x5f0 [dm_mod] dm_compat_ctl_ioctl+0x7/0x10 [dm_mod] __x64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x104/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x184/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e RIP: 0033:0xf7e6aead <snip> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: ffcc393 ("dm: enhance internal suspend and resume interface") Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 65e8fbd) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
PlaidCat
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 18, 2025
jira LE-3201 cve CVE-2024-27013 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-4.18.0-553.22.1.rt7.363.el8_10 commit-author Lei Chen <[email protected]> commit f8bbc07 vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f8bbc07) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
PlaidCat
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 18, 2025
jira LE-3201 cve CVE-2021-47101 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-4.18.0-553.22.1.rt7.363.el8_10 commit-author Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> commit 1406e8c Fix crash on reboot on a system with ASIX AX88178 USB adapter attached to it: | asix 1-1.4:1.0 eth0: unregister 'asix' usb-ci_hdrc.0-1.4, ASIX AX88178 USB 2.0 Ethernet | 8<--- cut here --- | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000028c | pgd = 5ec93aee | [0000028c] *pgd=00000000 | Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM | Modules linked in: | CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.14.0-rc1-20210811-1 #4 | Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) | PC is at phy_disconnect+0x8/0x48 | LR is at ax88772_unbind+0x14/0x20 | [<80650d04>] (phy_disconnect) from [<80741aa4>] (ax88772_unbind+0x14/0x20) | [<80741aa4>] (ax88772_unbind) from [<8074e250>] (usbnet_disconnect+0x48/0xd8) | [<8074e250>] (usbnet_disconnect) from [<807655e0>] (usb_unbind_interface+0x78/0x25c) | [<807655e0>] (usb_unbind_interface) from [<805b03a0>] (__device_release_driver+0x154/0x20c) | [<805b03a0>] (__device_release_driver) from [<805b0478>] (device_release_driver+0x20/0x2c) | [<805b0478>] (device_release_driver) from [<805af944>] (bus_remove_device+0xcc/0xf8) | [<805af944>] (bus_remove_device) from [<805ab26c>] (device_del+0x178/0x4b0) | [<805ab26c>] (device_del) from [<807634a4>] (usb_disable_device+0xcc/0x178) | [<807634a4>] (usb_disable_device) from [<8075a060>] (usb_disconnect+0xd8/0x238) | [<8075a060>] (usb_disconnect) from [<8075a02c>] (usb_disconnect+0xa4/0x238) | [<8075a02c>] (usb_disconnect) from [<8075a02c>] (usb_disconnect+0xa4/0x238) | [<8075a02c>] (usb_disconnect) from [<80af3520>] (usb_remove_hcd+0xa0/0x198) | [<80af3520>] (usb_remove_hcd) from [<807902e0>] (host_stop+0x38/0xa8) | [<807902e0>] (host_stop) from [<8078d9e4>] (ci_hdrc_remove+0x3c/0x118) | [<8078d9e4>] (ci_hdrc_remove) from [<805b27ec>] (platform_remove+0x20/0x50) | [<805b27ec>] (platform_remove) from [<805b03a0>] (__device_release_driver+0x154/0x20c) | [<805b03a0>] (__device_release_driver) from [<805b0478>] (device_release_driver+0x20/0x2c) | [<805b0478>] (device_release_driver) from [<805af944>] (bus_remove_device+0xcc/0xf8) | [<805af944>] (bus_remove_device) from [<805ab26c>] (device_del+0x178/0x4b0) For this adapter we call ax88178_bind() and ax88772_unbind(), which is related to different chip version and different counter part *bind() function. Since this chip is currently not ported to the PHYLIB, we do not need to call phy_disconnect() here. So, to fix this crash, we need to add ax88178_unbind(). Fixes: e532a09 ("net: usb: asix: ax88772: add phylib support") Reported-by: Robin van der Gracht <[email protected]> Tested-by: Robin van der Gracht <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 1406e8c) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
PlaidCat
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 18, 2025
jira LE-3201 cve CVE-2024-40904 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-4.18.0-553.22.1.rt7.363.el8_10 commit-author Alan Stern <[email protected]> commit 22f0081 The syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in the cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver's immediate resubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the dummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup: cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71 cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625] CPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup: #1: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #2: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #3: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #4: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #5: 98% system, 1% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle Modules linked in: irq event stamp: 73096 hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994 hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551 softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582 softirqs last disabled at (73043): [<ffff800080020de8>] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588 CPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Testing showed that the problem did not occur if the two error messages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding material to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time. In any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to avoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is to ratelimit the two dev_err() calls. Therefore we replace them with dev_err_ratelimited(). Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Greg KH <[email protected]> Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/ Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/ Fixes: 9908a32 ("USB: remove err() macro from usb class drivers") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 22f0081) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
PlaidCat
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 18, 2025
jira LE-3201 cve CVE-2024-38540 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-4.18.0-553.27.1.rt7.368.el8_10 commit-author Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> commit 78cfd17 Empty-Commit: Cherry-Pick Conflicts during history rebuild. Will be included in final tarball splat. Ref for failed cherry-pick at: ciq/ciq_backports/kernel-rt-4.18.0-553.27.1.rt7.368.el8_10/78cfd171.failed Undefined behavior is triggered when bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq is called with hwq_attr->aux_depth != 0 and hwq_attr->aux_stride == 0. In that case, "roundup_pow_of_two(hwq_attr->aux_stride)" gets called. roundup_pow_of_two is documented as undefined for 0. Fix it in the one caller that had this combination. The undefined behavior was detected by UBSAN: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 24 PID: 1075 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6+ #4 Hardware name: Abacus electric, s.r.o. - [email protected] Super Server/H12SSW-iN, BIOS 2.7 10/25/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x30 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0xec __roundup_pow_of_two+0x25/0x35 [bnxt_re] bnxt_qplib_alloc_init_hwq+0xa1/0x470 [bnxt_re] bnxt_qplib_create_qp+0x19e/0x840 [bnxt_re] bnxt_re_create_qp+0x9b1/0xcd0 [bnxt_re] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kmalloc+0x1b6/0x4f0 ? create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_create_qp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] create_qp.part.0+0x128/0x1c0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_kernel+0x50/0xd0 [ib_core] create_mad_qp+0x8e/0xe0 [ib_core] ? __pfx_qp_event_handler+0x10/0x10 [ib_core] ib_mad_init_device+0x2be/0x680 [ib_core] add_client_context+0x10d/0x1a0 [ib_core] enable_device_and_get+0xe0/0x1d0 [ib_core] ib_register_device+0x53c/0x630 [ib_core] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 bnxt_re_probe+0xbd8/0xe50 [bnxt_re] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_probe+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x49/0x80 ? driver_sysfs_add+0x57/0xc0 really_probe+0xde/0x340 ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90 ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0 bus_for_each_dev+0x8f/0xe0 bus_add_driver+0x146/0x220 driver_register+0x72/0xd0 __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6e/0xd0 ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] bnxt_re_mod_init+0x3e/0xff0 [bnxt_re] ? __pfx_bnxt_re_mod_init+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_re] do_one_initcall+0x5b/0x310 do_init_module+0x90/0x250 init_module_from_file+0x86/0xc0 idempotent_init_module+0x121/0x2b0 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x149/0x170 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x75/0x230 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __count_memcg_events+0x69/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x1a/0x30 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1f0/0x300 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x34e/0x640 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f4e5132821d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e3 db 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffca9c906a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563ec8a8f130 RCX: 00007f4e5132821d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f4e518fa07d RDI: 000000000000003b RBP: 00007ffca9c90760 R08: 00007f4e513f6b20 R09: 00007ffca9c906f0 R10: 0000563ec8a8faa0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4e518fa07d R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000563ec8409e90 R15: 0000563ec8a8fa60 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- Fixes: 0c4dcd6 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Refactor hardware queue memory allocation") Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Acked-by: Selvin Xavier <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 78cfd17) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]> # Conflicts: # drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c
PlaidCat
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 18, 2025
…le_direct_reclaim() jira LE-3201 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-rt-4.18.0-553.42.1.rt7.383.el8_10 commit-author Seiji Nishikawa <[email protected]> commit 6aaced5 The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false. #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974 #9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4 At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones: NODE: 4 ZONE: 0 ADDR: ffff00817fffe540 NAME: "DMA32" SIZE: 20480 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 359 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 NODE: 4 ZONE: 1 ADDR: ffff00817fffec00 NAME: "Normal" SIZE: 8454144 PRESENT: 98304 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 146 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages() based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero. Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/ active anonymous pages is skipped. crash> p nr_swap_pages nr_swap_pages = $1937 = { counter = 0 } As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark. The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented. crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures $1935 = 0x0 This is because the node deemed balanced. The node balancing logic in balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively. If one or more zones (e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the entire node is deemed balanced. This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain under significant pressure. The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages). This change prevents zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being mistakenly deemed unreclaimable. By doing so, the patch ensures proper node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL, and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false. The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL. This issue arises from zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file- backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient free pages to be skipped. The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones. Consequently, pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim(). This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist. This ensures zones with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and reclaim behavior. [[email protected]: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations") Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 6aaced5) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 19, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-93830 commit 053f3ff Author: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]> Date: Wed Apr 2 10:44:03 2025 -0500 net: ibmveth: make veth_pool_store stop hanging v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mamatha Inamdar <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 19, 2025
MR: https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/src/kernel/centos-stream-9/-/merge_requests/6946 Description: Updates for ibmveth pool store JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-93830 Build Info: https://brewweb.engineering.redhat.com/brew/taskinfo?taskID=67820140 Tested: Verified Brew build test kernel RPMs and confirmed issue is resovled Signed-off-by: Mamatha Inamdar <[email protected]> commit 053f3ff Author: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]> Date: Wed Apr 2 10:44:03 2025 -0500 net: ibmveth: make veth_pool_store stop hanging v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mamatha Inamdar <[email protected]> Approved-by: Steve Best <[email protected]> Approved-by: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]> Approved-by: CKI KWF Bot <[email protected]> Merged-by: Augusto Caringi <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 20, 2025
Before the commit under the Fixes tag below, bnxt_ulp_stop() and bnxt_ulp_start() were always invoked in pairs. After that commit, the new bnxt_ulp_restart() can be invoked after bnxt_ulp_stop() has been called. This may result in the RoCE driver's aux driver .suspend() method being invoked twice. The 2nd bnxt_re_suspend() call will crash when it dereferences a NULL pointer: (NULL ib_device): Handle device suspend call BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b78 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/u96:5 Tainted: G S 6.15.0-rc1 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017 Workqueue: bnxt_pf_wq bnxt_sp_task [bnxt_en] RIP: 0010:bnxt_re_suspend+0x45/0x1f0 [bnxt_re] Code: 8b 05 a7 3c 5b f5 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 49 8b 5c 24 08 4d 8b 2c 24 e8 ea 06 0a f4 48 c7 c6 04 60 52 c0 48 89 df e8 1b ce f9 ff <48> 8b 83 78 0b 00 00 48 8b 80 38 03 00 00 a8 40 0f 85 b5 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffa2e84084fd88 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb4b6b934 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffffa1760954c9c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffdfff R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa2e84084fb50 R12: ffffa176031ef070 R13: ffffa17609775000 R14: ffffa17603adc180 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa17daa397000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000b78 CR3: 00000004aaa30003 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> bnxt_ulp_stop+0x69/0x90 [bnxt_en] bnxt_sp_task+0x678/0x920 [bnxt_en] ? __schedule+0x514/0xf50 process_scheduled_works+0x9d/0x400 worker_thread+0x11c/0x260 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xfe/0x1e0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x40 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Check the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED flag and do not proceed if the flag is already set. This will preserve the original symmetrical bnxt_ulp_stop() and bnxt_ulp_start(). Also, inside bnxt_ulp_start(), clear the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED flag after taking the mutex to avoid any race condition. And for symmetry, only proceed in bnxt_ulp_start() if the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED is set. Fixes: 3c163f3 ("bnxt_en: Optimize recovery path ULP locking in the driver") Signed-off-by: Kalesh AP <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 20, 2025
[ Upstream commit ee684de ] As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 20, 2025
commit c98cc97 upstream. Running a modified trace-cmd record --nosplice where it does a mmap of the ring buffer when '--nosplice' is set, caused the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ trace-cmd/1113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100062888 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #5 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #4 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: __might_fault+0xa5/0x110 _copy_to_user+0x22/0x80 _perf_ioctl+0x61b/0x1b70 perf_ioctl+0x62/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0x325/0x7c0 perf_event_init+0x52a/0x5b0 start_kernel+0x263/0x3e0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x95/0xa0 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0xb7/0x7c0 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x2c0/0x1030 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0xbf/0x1f0 _cpu_up+0x2e7/0x690 cpu_up+0x117/0x170 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0xd5/0x120 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x13d/0x170 smp_init+0x2b/0xf0 kernel_init_freeable+0x441/0x6d0 kernel_init+0x1e/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xd0 ring_buffer_resize+0x610/0x14e0 __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x42/0x120 tracing_set_tracer+0x7bd/0xa80 tracing_set_trace_write+0x132/0x1e0 vfs_write+0x21c/0xe80 ksys_write+0xf9/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &buffer->mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &cpu_buffer->mapping_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&mm->mmap_lock); lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&buffer->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by trace-cmd/1113: #0: ffff888106b847e0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x192/0x390 #1: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 stack backtrace: CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1113 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x169/0x18c0 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? function_trace_call+0x296/0x370 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_function_trace_call+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x5/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x270 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? trace_preempt_on+0xd0/0x110 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx___mmap_region+0x10/0x10 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? bpf_lsm_mmap_addr+0x4/0x10 ? security_mmap_addr+0x46/0xd0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ? __pfx_do_mmap+0x10/0x10 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fb0963a7de2 Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 27 55 89 cd 53 48 89 fb 48 85 ff 74 3b 41 89 ea 48 89 df b8 09 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 76 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 00 48 8b 05 e1 9f 0d 00 64 RSP: 002b:00007ffdcc8fb878 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb0963a7de2 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffdcc8fbe68 R14: 00007fb096628000 R15: 00005633e01a5c90 </TASK> The issue is that cpus_read_lock() is taken within buffer->mutex. The memory mapped pages are taken with the mmap_lock held. The buffer->mutex is taken within the cpu_buffer->mapping_lock. There's quite a chain with all these locks, where the deadlock can be fixed by moving the cpus_read_lock() outside the taking of the buffer->mutex. Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Cc: Vincent Donnefort <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: 117c392 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 25, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-65718 Upstream status: Linus Conflicts: In mm/shmem.c there were 3 rejects: 1) hunk #5 due to missing upstream commit a2e4595 ("shmem: stable directory offsets") which added a call to function simple_offset_add() which is not added. 2) hunk #9 due to existing CentOS Stream commit 79e59ae ("shmem: convert to ctime accessor functions") which required the hunk to be applied manually. 3) hunk #10 due to missing Upstream commit 0c95c02 ("fs: drop unused posix acl handlers") which needed to be applied manually to allow for the differences. Also in mm/shmem.c there was a fuzz 2 in hunk #4 due to a white space difference and fuzz 2 in hunk #6 due to existing CentOS Stream commit 79e59ae ("shmem: convert to ctime accessor functions"). commit 2daf18a Author: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Date: Tue Aug 8 21:33:56 2023 -0700 tmpfs,xattr: enable limited user extended attributes Enable "user." extended attributes on tmpfs, limiting them by tracking the space they occupy, and deducting that space from the limited ispace (unless tmpfs mounted with nr_inodes=0 to leave that ispace unlimited). tmpfs inodes and simple xattrs are both unswappable, and have to be in lowmem on a 32-bit highmem kernel: so the ispace limit is appropriate for xattrs, without any need for a further mount option. Add simple_xattr_space() to give approximate but deterministic estimate of the space taken up by each xattr: with simple_xattrs_free() outputting the space freed if required (but kernfs and even some tmpfs usages do not require that, so don't waste time on strlen'ing if not needed). Security and trusted xattrs were already supported: for consistency and simplicity, account them from the same pool; though there's a small risk that a tmpfs with enough space before would now be considered too small. When extended attributes are used, "df -i" does show more IUsed and less IFree than can be explained by the inodes: document that (manpage later). xfstests tests/generic which were not run on tmpfs before but now pass: 020 037 062 070 077 097 103 117 337 377 454 486 523 533 611 618 728 with no new failures. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 28, 2025
…cal section JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-87008 commit 85b2b9c Author: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2025 15:26:52 -0800 locking/semaphore: Use wake_q to wake up processes outside lock critical section A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 28, 2025
…k critical section MR: https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/src/kernel/centos-stream-9/-/merge_requests/6733 JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-87008 commit 85b2b9c Author: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2025 15:26:52 -0800 locking/semaphore: Use wake_q to wake up processes outside lock critical section A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Approved-by: Čestmír Kalina <[email protected]> Approved-by: Phil Auld <[email protected]> Approved-by: CKI KWF Bot <[email protected]> Merged-by: Augusto Caringi <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 28, 2025
[ Upstream commit eedf3e3 ] ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3 This was originally done in NetBSD: NetBSD/src@b69d1ac and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I previously contributed to this repository. This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN: llvm/llvm-project@7926744 Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #1.2 0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1.1 0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1 0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #2 0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f #3 0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723 #4 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #5 0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089 #6 0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169 #7 0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a #8 0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7 #9 0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979 #10 0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f #11 0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf #12 0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278 #13 0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87 #14 0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d #15 0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e #16 0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad #17 0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e #18 0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7 #19 0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342 #20 0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3 #21 0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616 #22 0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323 #23 0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76 #24 0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831 #25 0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc #26 0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58 #27 0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159 #28 0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414 #29 0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d #30 0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7 #31 0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66 #32 0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9 #33 0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d #34 0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983 #35 0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e #36 0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509 #37 0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958 #38 0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247 #39 0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962 #40 0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30 #41 0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22 Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <[email protected]> [ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jun 28, 2025
[ Upstream commit 1e9ac33 ] Before the commit under the Fixes tag below, bnxt_ulp_stop() and bnxt_ulp_start() were always invoked in pairs. After that commit, the new bnxt_ulp_restart() can be invoked after bnxt_ulp_stop() has been called. This may result in the RoCE driver's aux driver .suspend() method being invoked twice. The 2nd bnxt_re_suspend() call will crash when it dereferences a NULL pointer: (NULL ib_device): Handle device suspend call BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b78 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/u96:5 Tainted: G S 6.15.0-rc1 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017 Workqueue: bnxt_pf_wq bnxt_sp_task [bnxt_en] RIP: 0010:bnxt_re_suspend+0x45/0x1f0 [bnxt_re] Code: 8b 05 a7 3c 5b f5 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 49 8b 5c 24 08 4d 8b 2c 24 e8 ea 06 0a f4 48 c7 c6 04 60 52 c0 48 89 df e8 1b ce f9 ff <48> 8b 83 78 0b 00 00 48 8b 80 38 03 00 00 a8 40 0f 85 b5 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffa2e84084fd88 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb4b6b934 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffffa1760954c9c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffdfff R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa2e84084fb50 R12: ffffa176031ef070 R13: ffffa17609775000 R14: ffffa17603adc180 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa17daa397000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000b78 CR3: 00000004aaa30003 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> bnxt_ulp_stop+0x69/0x90 [bnxt_en] bnxt_sp_task+0x678/0x920 [bnxt_en] ? __schedule+0x514/0xf50 process_scheduled_works+0x9d/0x400 worker_thread+0x11c/0x260 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xfe/0x1e0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x40 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Check the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED flag and do not proceed if the flag is already set. This will preserve the original symmetrical bnxt_ulp_stop() and bnxt_ulp_start(). Also, inside bnxt_ulp_start(), clear the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED flag after taking the mutex to avoid any race condition. And for symmetry, only proceed in bnxt_ulp_start() if the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED is set. Fixes: 3c163f3 ("bnxt_en: Optimize recovery path ULP locking in the driver") Signed-off-by: Kalesh AP <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
PlaidCat
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 1, 2025
jira LE-3467 cve CVE-2022-48919 Rebuild_History Non-Buildable kernel-4.18.0-553.58.1.el8_10 commit-author Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]> commit 3d6cc98 When cifs_get_root() fails during cifs_smb3_do_mount() we call deactivate_locked_super() which eventually will call delayed_free() which will free the context. In this situation we should not proceed to enter the out: section in cifs_smb3_do_mount() and free the same resources a second time. [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888364f4d110 by task swapper/1/0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G OE 5.17.0-rc3+ #4 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.0 12/17/2019 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Call Trace: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] <IRQ> [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x78 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x24/0x150 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] kasan_report.cold+0x7d/0x117 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __asan_load8+0x86/0xa0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_core+0x547/0xca0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? call_rcu+0x3c0/0x3c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? lock_is_held_type+0xea/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_core_si+0xe/0x10 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x67b [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __irq_exit_rcu+0x100/0x150 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x30 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] sysvec_hyperv_stimer0+0x9d/0xc0 ... [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] Freed by task 58179: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] ____kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x170 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xb3/0x1d0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kfree+0xcd/0x520 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x149/0xbe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] smb3_get_tree+0x1a0/0x2e0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] vfs_get_tree+0x52/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] path_mount+0x635/0x10c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __x64_sys_mount+0x1bf/0x210 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] Last potentially related work creation: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] call_rcu+0x76/0x3c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_umount+0xce/0xe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_kill_sb+0xc8/0xe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] deactivate_locked_super+0x5d/0xd0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0xab9/0xbe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] smb3_get_tree+0x1a0/0x2e0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] vfs_get_tree+0x52/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] path_mount+0x635/0x10c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __x64_sys_mount+0x1bf/0x210 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Reported-by: Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 3d6cc98) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 4, 2025
commit 1c7b17c Author: liuye <[email protected]> Date: Tue Nov 19 14:08:42 2024 +0800 mm/vmscan: fix hard LOCKUP in function isolate_lru_folios This fixes the following hard lockup in isolate_lru_folios() during memory reclaim. If the LRU mostly contains ineligible folios this may trigger watchdog. watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 173 RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x255/0x2a0 Call Trace: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x31/0x40 folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x5f/0x90 folio_batch_move_lru+0x91/0x150 lru_add_drain_per_cpu+0x1c/0x40 process_one_work+0x17d/0x350 worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0 kthread+0xe8/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 lruvec->lru_lock owner： PID: 2865 TASK: ffff888139214d40 CPU: 40 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [fffffe0000945e60] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffffa567a555 #1 [fffffe0000945e68] nmi_handle at ffffffffa563b171 #2 [fffffe0000945eb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffffa6575920 #3 [fffffe0000945ed0] exc_nmi at ffffffffa6575af4 #4 [fffffe0000945ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffffa6601dde [exception RIP: isolate_lru_folios+403] RIP: ffffffffa597df53 RSP: ffffc90006fb7c28 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffc90006fb7c60 RCX: ffffea04a2196f88 RDX: ffffc90006fb7c60 RSI: ffffc90006fb7c60 RDI: ffffea04a2197048 RBP: ffff88812cbd3010 R8: ffffea04a2197008 R9: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffea04a2197008 R13: ffffea04a2197048 R14: ffffc90006fb7de8 R15: 0000000003e3e937 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 <NMI exception stack> #5 [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53 #6 [ffffc90006fb7cf8] shrink_active_list at ffffffffa597f788 #7 [ffffc90006fb7da8] balance_pgdat at ffffffffa5986db0 #8 [ffffc90006fb7ec0] kswapd at ffffffffa5987354 #9 [ffffc90006fb7ef8] kthread at ffffffffa5748238 crash> Scenario: User processe are requesting a large amount of memory and keep page active. Then a module continuously requests memory from ZONE_DMA32 area. Memory reclaim will be triggered due to ZONE_DMA32 watermark alarm reached. However pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from the ZONE_NORMAL area. Reproduce: Terminal 1: Construct to continuously increase pages active(anon). mkdir /tmp/memory mount -t tmpfs -o size=1024000M tmpfs /tmp/memory dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/memory/block bs=4M tail /tmp/memory/block Terminal 2: vmstat -a 1 active will increase. procs ---memory--- ---swap-- ---io---- -system-- ---cpu--- ... r b swpd free inact active si so bi bo 1 0 0 1445623076 45898836 83646008 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 43450228 86094616 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 41003480 88541364 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 38557088 90987756 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 36109688 93435156 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619552 33663256 95881632 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 31217140 98327792 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 28769988 100774944 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 26322348 103222584 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 23875592 105669340 0 0 0 cat /proc/meminfo | head Active(anon) increase. MemTotal: 1579941036 kB MemFree: 1445618500 kB MemAvailable: 1453013224 kB Buffers: 6516 kB Cached: 128653956 kB SwapCached: 0 kB Active: 118110812 kB Inactive: 11436620 kB Active(anon): 115345744 kB Inactive(anon): 945292 kB When the Active(anon) is 115345744 kB, insmod module triggers the ZONE_DMA32 watermark. perf record -e vmscan:mm_vmscan_lru_isolate -aR perf script isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=2 nr_skipped=2 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0 nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844 nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844 nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=29 nr_skipped=29 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0 nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon See nr_scanned=28835844. 28835844 * 4k = 115343376KB approximately equal to 115345744 kB. If increase Active(anon) to 1000G then insmod module triggers the ZONE_DMA32 watermark. hard lockup will occur. In my device nr_scanned = 0000000003e3e937 when hard lockup. Convert to memory size 0x0000000003e3e937 * 4KB = 261072092 KB. [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53 ffffc90006fb7c30: 0000000000000020 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c40: ffffc90006fb7d40 ffff88812cbd3000 ffffc90006fb7c50: ffffc90006fb7d30 0000000106fb7de8 ffffc90006fb7c60: ffffea04a2197008 ffffea0006ed4a48 ffffc90006fb7c70: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c90: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7ca0: 0000000000000000 0000000003e3e937 ffffc90006fb7cb0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7cc0: 8d7c0b56b7874b00 ffff88812cbd3000 About the Fixes: Why did it take eight years to be discovered? The problem requires the following conditions to occur: 1. The device memory should be large enough. 2. Pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from the ZONE_NORMAL area. 3. The memory in ZONE_DMA32 needs to reach the watermark. If the memory is not large enough, or if the usage design of ZONE_DMA32 area memory is reasonable, this problem is difficult to detect. notes: The problem is most likely to occur in ZONE_DMA32 and ZONE_NORMAL, but other suitable scenarios may also trigger the problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: b2e1875 ("mm, vmscan: begin reclaiming pages on a per-node basis") Signed-off-by: liuye <[email protected]> Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-77742 Signed-off-by: Nico Pache <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 4, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-78197 upstream ======== commit e1f5bb1 Author: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Date: Thu Mar 6 22:12:50 2025 -0800 description =========== Ian told me that there are many memory leaks in the hierarchy mode. I can easily reproduce it with the follwing command. $ make DEBUG=1 EXTRA_CFLAGS=-fsanitize=leak $ perf record --latency -g -- ./perf test -w thloop $ perf report -H --stdio ... Indirect leak of 168 byte(s) in 21 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f3414c16c65 in malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:75 #1 0x55ed3602346e in map__get util/map.h:189 #2 0x55ed36024cc4 in hist_entry__init util/hist.c:476 #3 0x55ed36025208 in hist_entry__new util/hist.c:588 #4 0x55ed36027c05 in hierarchy_insert_entry util/hist.c:1587 #5 0x55ed36027e2e in hists__hierarchy_insert_entry util/hist.c:1638 #6 0x55ed36027fa4 in hists__collapse_insert_entry util/hist.c:1685 #7 0x55ed360283e8 in hists__collapse_resort util/hist.c:1776 #8 0x55ed35de0323 in report__collapse_hists /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-report.c:735 #9 0x55ed35de15b4 in __cmd_report /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1119 #10 0x55ed35de43dc in cmd_report /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1867 #11 0x55ed35e66767 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:351 #12 0x55ed35e66a0e in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:404 #13 0x55ed35e66b67 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:448 #14 0x55ed35e66eb0 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:556 #15 0x7f340ac33d67 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 ... $ perf report -H --stdio 2>&1 | grep -c '^Indirect leak' 93 I found that hist_entry__delete() missed to release child entries in the hierarchy tree (hroot_{in,out}). It needs to iterate the child entries and call hist_entry__delete() recursively. After this change: $ perf report -H --stdio 2>&1 | grep -c '^Indirect leak' 0 Reported-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Tested-by Thomas Falcon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 4, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-78197 upstream ======== commit 9daa05c Author: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Date: Mon Mar 10 17:04:16 2025 -0700 description =========== The env.pmu_mapping can be leaked when it reads data from a pipe on AMD. For a pipe data, it reads the header data including pmu_mapping from PERF_RECORD_HEADER_FEATURE runtime. But it's already set in: perf_session__new() __perf_session__new() evlist__init_trace_event_sample_raw() evlist__has_amd_ibs() perf_env__nr_pmu_mappings() Then it'll overwrite that when it processes the HEADER_FEATURE record. Here's a report from address sanitizer. Direct leak of 2689 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fed8f814596 in realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x5595a7d416b1 in strbuf_grow util/strbuf.c:64 #2 0x5595a7d414ef in strbuf_init util/strbuf.c:25 #3 0x5595a7d0f4b7 in perf_env__read_pmu_mappings util/env.c:362 #4 0x5595a7d12ab7 in perf_env__nr_pmu_mappings util/env.c:517 #5 0x5595a7d89d2f in evlist__has_amd_ibs util/amd-sample-raw.c:315 #6 0x5595a7d87fb2 in evlist__init_trace_event_sample_raw util/sample-raw.c:23 #7 0x5595a7d7f893 in __perf_session__new util/session.c:179 #8 0x5595a7b79572 in perf_session__new util/session.h:115 #9 0x5595a7b7e9dc in cmd_report builtin-report.c:1603 #10 0x5595a7c019eb in run_builtin perf.c:351 #11 0x5595a7c01c92 in handle_internal_command perf.c:404 #12 0x5595a7c01deb in run_argv perf.c:448 #13 0x5595a7c02134 in main perf.c:556 #14 0x7fed85833d67 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 Let's free the existing pmu_mapping data if any. Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 5, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-78837 CVE: CVE-2024-57980 commit c6ef3a7 Author: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2024 01:51:30 +0200 If the uvc_status_init() function fails to allocate the int_urb, it will free the dev->status pointer but doesn't reset the pointer to NULL. This results in the kfree() call in uvc_status_cleanup() trying to double-free the memory. Fix it by resetting the dev->status pointer to NULL after freeing it. Fixes: a31a405 ("V4L/DVB:usbvideo:don't use part of buffer for USB transfer #4") Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]> Reviewed by: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Desnes Nunes <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 5, 2025
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-96372 CVE: CVE-2025-37958 Conflicts: * context conflicts due to RHEL-9 missing upstream commit 29e847d ("mm/rmap: integrate PMD-mapped folio splitting into pagewalk loop") which is part of a bigger series "Reclaim lazyfree THP without splitting" and is irrelevant to the fixlet for this CVE. commit be6e843 Author: Gavin Guo <[email protected]> Date: Mon Apr 21 19:35:36 2025 +0800 mm/huge_memory: fix dereferencing invalid pmd migration entry When migrating a THP, concurrent access to the PMD migration entry during a deferred split scan can lead to an invalid address access, as illustrated below. To prevent this invalid access, it is necessary to check the PMD migration entry and return early. In this context, there is no need to use pmd_to_swp_entry and pfn_swap_entry_to_page to verify the equality of the target folio. Since the PMD migration entry is locked, it cannot be served as the target. Mailing list discussion and explanation from Hugh Dickins: "An anon_vma lookup points to a location which may contain the folio of interest, but might instead contain another folio: and weeding out those other folios is precisely what the "folio != pmd_folio((*pmd)" check (and the "risk of replacing the wrong folio" comment a few lines above it) is for." BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea60001db008 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2199114 Comm: tee Not tainted 6.14.0+ #4 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:split_huge_pmd_locked+0x3b5/0x2b60 Call Trace: <TASK> try_to_migrate_one+0x28c/0x3730 rmap_walk_anon+0x4f6/0x770 unmap_folio+0x196/0x1f0 split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x9f6/0x1560 deferred_split_scan+0xac5/0x12a0 shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x376/0x470 full_proxy_write+0x15c/0x220 vfs_write+0x2fc/0xcb0 ksys_write+0x146/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The bug is found by syzkaller on an internal kernel, then confirmed on upstream. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Fixes: 84c3fc4 ("mm: thp: check pmd migration entry in common path") Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Acked-by: Zi Yan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <[email protected]> Cc: Florent Revest <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]> Cc: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <[email protected]>
github-actions bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 5, 2025
… context The current use of a mutex to protect the notifier hashtable accesses can lead to issues in the atomic context. It results in the below kernel warnings: | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:258 | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 9, name: kworker/0:0 | preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 | RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 | CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.14.0 #4 | Workqueue: ffa_pcpu_irq_notification notif_pcpu_irq_work_fn | Call trace: | show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) | dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0x90 | dump_stack+0x18/0x24 | __might_resched+0x114/0x170 | __might_sleep+0x48/0x98 | mutex_lock+0x24/0x80 | handle_notif_callbacks+0x54/0xe0 | notif_get_and_handle+0x40/0x88 | generic_exec_single+0x80/0xc0 | smp_call_function_single+0xfc/0x1a0 | notif_pcpu_irq_work_fn+0x2c/0x38 | process_one_work+0x14c/0x2b4 | worker_thread+0x2e4/0x3e0 | kthread+0x13c/0x210 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 To address this, replace the mutex with an rwlock to protect the notifier hashtable accesses. This ensures that read-side locking does not sleep and multiple readers can acquire the lock concurrently, avoiding unnecessary contention and potential deadlocks. Writer access remains exclusive, preserving correctness. This change resolves warnings from lockdep about potential sleep in atomic context. Cc: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jérôme Forissier <[email protected]> Closes: OP-TEE/optee_os#7394 Fixes: e057344 ("firmware: arm_ffa: Add interfaces to request notification callbacks") Message-Id: <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Bug fix requested by SIG-CLOUD user to address users needs with GPUs, CUDA and HMM.
This is the integration and temporary fix to allow the
HMMkselftestto not live in an infinite loop.Internal Ticket: SECO-170
BUILD
kABI Check
See in the build log
Kernel Self Tests
There have been issues with
kselftestsfor Rocky9 so in this case we're only testing the HMM situation. Which also has its own problems in TEARDOWN on Failure.5 Runs per pre and post update
hmm_update_wrong.txtis intentionally wrong to show that there is data that is differentExample