Exploiting Determinism in lattice-based signatures: Practical Fault Attacks on pqm4 implementations of NIST candidates

This repository is the source code from the forgery attack on the Dilithium signature scheme [1], a lattice-based candidate for the NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standardisation process [2]. The results of this research is reported in the paper by blah blah blah [3], and was presented at the the 14th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM ASIACCS 2019), held in Auckland, New Zeland, July 7th to July 12th, 2019. The paper can also be found at https://eprint.iacr.org.

[1] Vadim Lyubashevsky, Leo Ducas, Eike Kiltz, Tancrede Lepoint, Peter Schwabe, Gregor Seiler, and Damien Stehle. 2017. CRYSTALS-Dilithium. Technical Report. National Institute of Standards and Technology. available at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-1-submissions.

[2] NIST. 2016. Post-Quantum Crypto Project. http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/post-quantum-crypto/.

[3] blah blah blah. 2019. Exploiting Determinism in lattice-based signatures: Practical Fault Attacks on pqm4 implementations of NIST candidates. In Proceedings of the 2019 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. x-y). ACM.